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Abstract:  
From an institutional perspective, nationality and citizenship rights are the basic elements of 
citizenship. Individuals gain citizenship either through jus soli or by jus sanguinis. Citizenship is 
believed to be closely related to a country’s political structure: a unitary system has one level of 
citizenship, often understood as nationality, while a federal system may have two levels of 
citizenship, that is, citizenship at the federal level and at the sub-national state level. However, a 
case study of China depicts a rather different context: the criteria for accessing citizenship are 
more flexible and the institutional structure of citizenship is more complicated. Besides jus 
sanguinis, other elements, such as certain political considerations, economic investments, and 
technology transfers, are paths to citizenship. Additionally, besides the concept of nationality 
defined by national citizenship, hukou (household registration) and ethnicity are the most 
important determinants of sub-national citizenship. In mainland China, citizenship functions 
more as the ruling class strategy.  
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The focus of this paper is on the institutional structure of citizenship in the contemporary People’s 
Republic of China (hereafter China). There are two main reasons why I chose this topic. First, 
existing citizenship studies focus on European cases. The study of an East Asian case will help 
to expand the scholarship on, and show the complexities of, citizenship. More specifically, if 
China’s case is markedly different than existing cases, this paper can then help enrich knowledge 
about citizenship. Second, based on the study of China’s citizenship institutions, this study will 
allow us to better understand Chinese politics.  
With the institutional structure of Chinese citizenship as the core, this paper is divided into six 
parts. The first part illustrates why the study of citizenship matters in the Chinese context. The 
second part conceptualizes citizenship so as to lay a solid base for further discussion. Third, no 
matter in which country, nationality is often considered to be the first and foremost citizenship 
definition for individuals, thus, the third part explores the historical change and current situation 
of Chinese nationality. Though China is thought to be a typical unitary government, the 
institutional form of citizenship is by no means single and universal. Instead, below the concept 
of Chinese nationality, there are different categories of citizenship based on different sub-national 
criteria. The fourth and fifth parts then discuss different sub-national citizenships in China. More 
specifically, the fourth part focuses on citizenship based on the institution of hukou (household 
registration), looking into how the hukou shapes individuals’ status and rights within the Chinese 
citizenry. The fifth part probes into citizenship based on the institution of regional ethnic 
autonomy, evaluating how ethnicity shapes individuals’ citizenship. The last part concludes with 
a generalization of the main features of Chinese citizenship and discusses the general 
implications for citizenship studies.  
1. DOES CITIZENSHIP MATTER IN CHINA? 
At first glance, mapping the institutions of citizenship in the Chinese context promises to be an 
excursion into the world of make-believe. Since at least Weber’s time, citizenship has been 
considered a unique product of Western political and cultural heritage and is often linked with 
notions such as political equality, rights, democracy, and national identity. Not only were the 
natural, social, and political environments in Eastern societies such as China and India thought 
to be incompatible with the requirements of citizenship (Weber,1958:83; Montesquieu, 
2011:126-128; Witfogel,1981), Chinese intellectuals themselves in the early 20th century also 
thought that in China, there were only slaves and bumin (tribal people) rather than guomin 
(citizens)(Liang,2010:179; Zhang & Wang,1977:73). Even in the present era, citizens still play 
no meaningful part in choosing political leaders and have only marginal roles in electing the 
people’s congress, even though it has a very limited function in policy-making and checking the 
power of the party and the executive branch(O’Brien, 2002:213). 
Be that as it may, the subject of citizenship cannot be readily kicked away in China. For one thing, 
there are no necessary connections between citizenship and equality, right, and democracy. As 
Charles Tilly (1995a:233) argued, the authoritarian regimes of Mussolini, Hitler and Franco all 
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emphasized bonds of citizenship and Mann(1996) also identified five variables of citizenship, 
only one of which is associated with the elements of equality, democracy, and rights. On the 
other hand, many studies have shown that citizenship not only exists in China in various forms, 
but also plays various functions, some of which are not necessary related to democracy, equality 
or rights. For example, according to Guo(2014:365-375), the origin of Chinese citizenship can 
be traced back to the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic of China (around the turn of the 
20th century), when China was in the abyss of colonization under the Western powers, 
intellectuals wished to found a Chinese modern state by translating western citizenship. Culp’s 
(2007:2-3) study has shown that there was a rich citizenship education in southeastern China 
during the period of 1912-1940, the aim of which was to “offer answers to the crises of 
sociopolitical order and mounting imperialism that China confronted at the start of the twentieth 
century”. O’Brien and Li’s (2006) study demonstrated that even in the remote Chinese villages 
that seem to be least associated with citizenship, there were various kinds of citizenship practices. 
Other scholars have also indicated that the concept and practices of citizenship are important in 
the ethnic autonomous regions populated mostly by minorities(Shih, 2002; Yi, 2006). 
Insomuch as it is clear that citizenship, the West, and democratic regimes cannot be tied up in 
one neat bundle, and China has its various forms and rich practices of citizenship as well, it 
becomes reasonable to explore the institutions of citizenship in contemporary China. But if 
citizenship exists in Chinese cities, villages, and autonomous regions in a variety of forms and 
fulfills different functions, how should we conceptualize it? 
2. CONCEPTUALIZING CITIZENSHIP 
While citizenship can be traced back to Greek and Roman in antiquity, the rise of modern 
citizenship began with the development of cities in Medieval Europe, where the public sphere 
began to emerge between the state and the “burgers” who worked in the workshops and the 
peasants who worked in the fields(Weber, 1958: 91-108). With the advent of modern capitalist 
revolutions and the beginning of the nation-state era in the 17th and 18th centuries, citizenship 
became a universal status of individuals in most Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on this 
development, a contractual relationship between the state and the individual became the main 
political scenario and the traditional relationship of master and slave between the ruler and the 
subject became illaudable and illegitimate. According to this contractual relationship, the state is 
obliged to protect its citizens and to endow them with citizenship rights. In return, citizens must 
contribute their allegiance to and fulfill their obligations for their states as long as the latter has 
met their requirements for a political identity and citizenship rights(Heater,1999:115). As a result, 
modern citizenship not only reversed the direction of political thinking, which had lasted for 
more than one thousand years in the West, it has also helped to set up the political framework of 
the modern nation-state(Faulks,2000:31-35; Janoski, 2013).  
With the rise of globalization and post-industrialism in the second half of the 20th century, 
citizenship came to the fore again and became closely related to various issues and problems of 
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the contemporary world (Roche, 1992; Habermas, 2000). In 1949, British sociologist 
T.H.Marshall gave a seminal speech, Citizenship and Social Class, at Cambridge, which marked 
a new beginning of citizenship study in contemporary times. Thereafter, the concept of 
citizenship was interpreted from various perspectives with different and new notions about 
citizenship formed and theorized. For instance, reflecting on traditional citizenship, feminists 
brought forward “woman-friendly”(Lister, 2003) and “differentiated”(Young, 1990) citizenships, 
ecologists proposed “environmental” citizenship(Dobson, 2003), and multiculturalists suggested 
“multicultural” citizenship(Kymlicka, 1996). Besides these, “intimate citizenship”, “enterprise 
citizenship,” and many other concepts have also influenced the concept of citizenship. Faced with 
such chaos, it is worthwhile to ask whether we still have anything in common in the 
understanding of citizenship(Fahrmeir, 2007; Delanty, 2000). 
For many years I have worked on the concept of citizenship and tried to clarify its complicated 
meaning in the contemporary context(Guo, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). Generally speaking, from the 
institutional perspective, citizenship is mainly demonstrated through institutions concerning 
nationality, rights, and obligations. Citizenship is often understood as the full membership an 
individual holds in a political community. In modern times, the nation-state is the basic and 
foremost form of political community. Nationality, which means the formal membership an 
individual holds in a nation-state, is thus thought to be the basic meaning of citizenship. For 
example, Miller et al. (1991) said, citizenship and nationality are two sides of the same political 
coin. Heater(1999:95) also pointed out that “[f]or two hundred years citizenship and nationality 
have been political Siamese twins.” In T. H. Marshall’s speech of Citizenship and Social Class, 
citizenship was also regarded as the status of being “accepted as full members of the society, that 
is, as citizens” (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992:6). 
An individual’s full membership in a political community results in the secondary meaning of 
citizenship: rights and obligations (Janoski, 1998; Xia,2013). As to what categories of citizenship 
rights and obligations a citizen should entail, different scholars have different understandings. 
T.H.Marshall divided citizenship rights into three categories: the civil, political and social 
elements.  
The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty 
of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice…By the political element I mean the 
right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested 
with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body…By the social 
element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare 
and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life 
of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society (Marshall, 
1963:74).  
Marshall did not say much about obligations, though his illustration about citizenship rights 
caused long and vehement debates in the field of citizenship studies (Giddens, 1982; Turner, 
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1986). Based on the Marshallian paradigm, Janoski expounded citizenship rights and obligations 
even further. According to his viewpoints, though T. H. Marshall’s division of citizenship rights 
is basic and enlightening, he neglected a very important sphere, the market sphere, which is based 
on participatory rights. So, he argued that citizenship rights should be divided into four categories: 
legal rights (which are almost equal to Marshall’s civil rights), political rights, social rights, and 
participation rights (Janoski, 1998: 30-31). Corresponding to these four types of citizenship rights, 
there are four types of citizenship obligations as well: legal obligations, political obligations, 
social obligations, and participation obligations(Janoski, 1998: 54-55). Based on the premise of 
nationality, rights and obligations become indispensable ingredients of citizenship.  
Given that there are abundant controversies concerning the concept of citizenship, I shall not list 
its other meanings, though they may also be very important and insightful for the analysis of this 
article, such as understanding citizenship from the perspective of identity(Tilly,1995b; 
Miller,2000) and acts(Isin and Nielsen, 2008). In this article, I will confine my analysis to the 
institutional dimensions and understand citizenship as formal membership in a political 
community and the rights that result from such a membership. I will not say much about 
obligations throughout this article, though they are by no means unimportant. The main reason 
for doing this is that memberships in different groups, such as in urban and ethnic communities, 
endow individuals differential special rights rather than obligations. Next, in the following three 
parts, I concentrate on Chinese citizenship based on nationality, hukou (household registration), 
and ethnicity, analyzing the institutional framework of Chinese citizenship and the political idea 
behind it. 
3. CHINESE CITIZENSHIP AS NATIONALITY  
Though citizenship is a relatively recent phenomenon in China, it developed multiple forms in 
the past one and a half centuries. In 1842, when the Qing Dynasty1 was forced to sign the Nanjing 
Treaty with the British government, Chinese political leaders gradually learned about modern 
politics and discovered that the world was composed of a limited number of nation-states with 
equal status, rather than the long recognized Tianxia(heaven) system, within which China was 
situated at the center and other states at the periphery. Under the influence of international legal 
practices and foreign nationality laws, in 1909, the Qing court began to enact the nationality law 
and to apply patrilineal jus sanguinis to regulate its subjects, which meant that the children of a 
Qing subject acquired their father’s nationality by nature. From 1912 to 1949, the Republic of 
China (ROC) replaced the Qing Dynasty and promulgated two nationality laws in 1914 and 1929, 
which were in substantial agreement with the 1909 statute but eliminated some discriminatory 
provisions against women. In 1949, the PRC was founded. The PRC did not usher in a new legal 
definition of Chinese citizenship at the beginning of its governance and maintained the 1929 
Nationality Law of the ROC until the mid-1950s. In 1954, the PRC promulgated its first 
                                                             
1 Qing was the last dynasty in Chinese history, which was founded by the ethnic group of Manchu in 1644 and 
was overthrown by Xinhai Revolution in 1911. 
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constitution, which defined the boundary of Chinese citizenry. Although China signed a series of 
treaties concerning the legal status of overseas Chinese with Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongol, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand, and other countries, the formal Nationality Law was not promulgated 
until 1980 (Wang, 1983; Yu, 1983). Afterwards, the 1982 constitution of the PRC also included 
provisions regarding Chinese nationality.  
At the beginning of the PRC era, the Chinese government adopted the principle of jus sanguinis 
and recognized dual citizenship, but by the end of the 1950s, the PRC launched a new nationality 
policy, which ceased to recognize dual citizenship. There are several reasons for such a policy 
change(Choe, 2006). First, after the Second World War, many Southeast Asian countries became 
sovereign states. These new countries, which were heavily populated by ethnic Chinese, faced 
the problems of producing their own loyal citizens and protecting the integrity of their 
sovereignty. These non-communist countries became very weary of Chinese dual citizenship 
policies and the communist revolution. Faced with these challenges, in order to establish good 
relationships with its neighbors, the PRC adjusted its citizenship policies towards the overseas 
Chinese and gave up the dual citizenship provisions. Second, at the end of the 1950s, the PRC 
changed its perceptions concerning international relations and foreign policies and shifted from 
“one-side policy”(yibiandao zhengce) and “socialist camp orientation” to “set up a separate 
kitchen”(lingqi luzao) and “third world orientation.” There were a series of debates between the 
PRC and the former Soviet Union regarding the essence of socialism during that period, which 
finally resulted in the PRC divorcing itself from the socialist camp and joining the third world 
circle. Against such a background, China endeavored to establish good relationships with third 
world countries and to gain support from them, for which eliminating the dual nationality clause 
was a necessity. There were also other reasons such as the recognition of the political climate at 
the time. When the PRC still followed the line of the “socialist camp” and allowed dual 
citizenship, the political leaders hoped that the overseas Chinese could help export the Chinese 
communist revolution to their settled countries, so they kept the Nationality Law which 
recognized dual citizenship and regarded the overseas Chinese as PRC’s citizens. But when they 
found that the communist revolution had little resonance among the overseas Chinese, they 
decided to forsake the dual citizenship policy and to encourage the overseas Chinese to acquire 
citizenship in their settled countries(Cohen and Chou,1974). This situation didn’t change until 
the Reform and Opening era. 
In 1978, the top Chinese political leader Deng Xiaoping initiated the Reform and Opening policy, 
which aimed to grow the Chinese economy. The goal of economic growth helped to reshape 
PRC’s nationality policy. In order to attract the investment and technology transfers from 
overseas Chinese then needed to realize Chinese modernization, the PRC changed its citizenship 
policies dramatically. In 1979, when talking with other top political leaders, Deng(1994: 156-
157) said, “[n]ow we are focusing on construction, we need to find out every possible way. We 
not only must attract foreign capitals and techniques, but also need to encourage overseas Chinese 
to come back to establish factories…We must depend on both domestic citizens and overseas 
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Chinese, as long as they are patriotic and capable.” In the same year, the Chinese official 
newspaper, the People’s Daily(Renmin Ribao) published an official editorial titled “Attention 
must be Paid to Overseas Chinese Affairs”(“Bixu Zhongshi Qiaowu Gongzuo”) and argued that 
overseas Chinese constituted part of the Chinese nation (People’s Daily, 1978). Out of such 
considerations, the PRC blurred the distinction between overseas Chinese holding Chinese 
citizenship (huaqiao) and ethnic overseas Chinese holding foreign citizenship (huayi) and started 
to give privileges to both to woo them back to invest.  
These privileges include, for example, setting up various organizations to solve overseas Chinese 
affairs, giving overseas Chinese various social rights, and providing them with the convenience 
to enter and depart China, etc. With these favorable policies, many overseas Chinese started to 
move to China to invest. According to one statistic announced by the Chinese official news 
agency, Xinhua, in 1989, investments made by overseas Chinese and residents of Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan amounted to thirty billion dollars, which accounted for over seventy percent 
of the total foreign investments in China (Choe,2006). Thereafter, this percentage remained 
nearly the same or even increased. Such as, in 2005, foreign investments in China amounted to 
more than sixty billion dollars, among which, more than seventy percent were from overseas 
Chinese (Zhu and Jia, 2006). China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, after 
that, the Chinese government began to use a green card system to attract foreign investment. But 
this green card system was mainly used for overseas Chinese rather than non-Chinese foreigners. 
According to one statistic released by Xinhua, the number of foreigners who were granted a green 
card was fewer than 100, although some 600,000 worked in China before 2001 (Xinhua News 
Agency, 2001). However, from 2010-2012, the number increased to 564, 656, and 1202 
respectively (Global Times, 2013). More than half of these green cards were given to ethnic 
overseas Chinese who had already held American, Canadian, Australian, German, and Japanese 
citizenships. Most of the recipients were experts, scientists, or entrepreneurs. The green card 
system enabled them to live in China permanently and to enjoy various rights that they had 
previously been excluded from.  
As a conclusion of this section, if we regard citizenship as nationality, contemporary Chinese 
citizenship is made up of jus sanguinis for native Chinese and the green card for foreigners. As 
to the first part, the fourth provision of Chinese Nationality Law stipulates, “[a]ny person born in 
China whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national 
shall have Chinese nationality”(National People’s Congress, 1980). That means the basic 
determinant for a person to get Chinese nationality is through having a Chinese citizen as a parent. 
In 1996, Qiao Xiaoyang, dean of the Legal Committee of the Chinese Congress, said, “Chinese 
nationality is based on jus sanguinis, but at the same time supplemented by other principles” 
(Qiao, 1996). As to the second part, although the green card does not grant formal or full Chinese 
nationality to its holders, it entails substantial citizenship rights and forms a supplementary part 
of Chinese nationality. The reason that the Chinese government issues the green card is mainly 
out of the consideration of national political and economic interests. That is, in order to attract 
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foreign investment and technology, it grants green cards to foreigners, especially overseas 
Chinese, who have already held foreign nationalities to encourage them to contribute for China’s 
modernization.  
4. CHINESE CITIZENSHIP AS HUKOU (HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION)  
If we regard citizenship as a set of institutions that pertain to membership in a political 
community and a right to an allocation of resources, then, apart from nationality, Chinese 
citizenship also depends on hukou status. While nationality creates a distinction between Chinese 
and foreigners, hukou creates a distinction between urban and rural residents. Although in post-
1949 China, nearly every version of the Chinese constitution adopted the same provision that 
“[a]ll persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens, equal before 
the law, and enjoying the rights while performing the duties prescribed in the constitution and 
the law,” the Chinese citizenry are by no means homogeneous and equal, among which, the 
inequality between rural and urban is the most striking. The hukou institution established two 
separate and independent communities in China’s rural and urban areas, and membership in 
different communities entitled individuals different rights and duties.  
There were three main steps that formed the household regulations and all of which happened in 
1955. First, in June, the State Council enacted the household registration system with the 
Directive on the Establishment of a Permanent System of Household Registration, which required 
all households, both in the rural and urban areas, to be registered. Second, in August, the same 
body promulgated Temporary Methods for Supplying Urban Grain Rations, which associated 
household status with state grain and made it clear that only urban households were eligible for 
grain rations. And third, in November the Criteria for the Demarcation of Urban and Rural Areas 
was promulgated, which not only carved a clear boundary between rural areas and the city, but 
also legitimated the urban households’ greater access to rights than the rural ones. With these 
three pronouncements, two separate and unequal communities were formed in China’s rural and 
urban areas. As a result, in early 1958 the National People’s Congress passed Regulations on 
Household Registration in the People’s Republic of China (hereafter Regulations), which marked 
the systematization of the division between peasantry and urbanites. Thereafter, in the two 
succeeding decades, peasants were locked in the fields, growing the foodstuffs needed to feed 
the urban workers and sustain the cities(Whyte, 1995:4).  
The household registration system entailed political purposes and resource controls and was used 
by the state as a means to isolate peasantry from urbanites, country from city, not just 
geographically but socially as well: to create what amounted to “institutional boundaries” 
between them(Solinger, 1999:27). According to the provisions of the Regulations, “citizens 
throughout the country must have their household status registered”(provision 2); “[r]ural 
residents are forbidden from moving to cities unless they get the related certificates from urban 
employment offices or schools” (provision 10); and “[r]ural residents who stay longer than three 
days in the cities must apply for temporary residence at the office of urban hukou registration and 
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must register upon leaving”(provision 15). Through these provisions, the state restricted free 
movement between the rural and urban areas and established two enclosed systems, which 
marked different memberships and entailed different citizenship rights. 
This begs the question: why did the Chinese Communist Party(hereafter, the CCP) establish such 
a rigid system throughout the country? First, from the Opium War (1840) onwards, because of 
foreign invasions and internal riots, Chinese political leaders endeavored to establish a strong 
political authority to unify the country and to sufficiently control the territory and population. 
The CCP had the same dream and finally achieved this goal through the household registration 
system. The institution of household registration enabled the CCP to have a tight control over the 
whole population for its own ends of unity and territorial control.  
Second, the CCP was influenced by the former Soviet Union and Marxism. As China’s new 
leaders after 1949 began to build their socialist country, they drew upon a range of practices 
pioneered by the former Soviet Union, among which was the tenet of Marxist attitudes towards 
the flow of population. According to Marxist doctrine, capitalism was the main cause of the 
spontaneous movement of population, a state aspiring to be socialist would need to avoid 
allowing people to accumulate spontaneously in cities. If a state had to bring in labor from the 
rural areas to develop the productive forces, it must be under control of the state. With this belief, 
after 1932, the Soviets created internal passports for urban residents, which didn’t extend to rural 
residents until 1974, to limit the flow of population. China had a strong belief in Marxism during 
that period and copied the same practice from the Soviets, albeit with its own adaption. 
Third, the specific needs of China’s planned economy necessitated the household registration 
system’s establishment. In order to establish a pure socialist state, Chinese leaders changed its 
economy to a planned economy in the middle of the 1950s. A planned economy, with its manifold 
forms of arrangement, provision, and supply, was feasible only on the foundation of tight 
population control, which, in turn, demanded a registration system. Ideally, registration stabilized 
the location of the individual workers as a means of organizing production and allocating 
resources. In the succeeding two decades after the 1950s, household registration played such a 
role for communist China.  
Last but not least, the specific strategy of socialist construction Chinese leaders held during that 
period drove the establishment of the system. After the foundation of the People’s Republic of 
China, especially after the establishment of the planned economy in the mid-1950s, 
“industrialization” became the solitary goal for Chinese socialist construction. In order to catch 
up with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other advanced capitalist states, Chinese 
political leaders launched a huge push for industrialization, “the Great Leap Forward.” During 
this process, the institution of household registration played many important roles: it enabled the 
state to calibrate the pace of industrialization by controlling the size of the legal labor force in 
cities and, by barricading the cities against peasants, it also made the peasantry a labor reserve, 
readily available for the big spurts of industrial growth and disposable in tighter times 
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(Solinger,1999:37; Lu,2004), and, by restraining the prices of agricultural products to a very low 
level, the state could levy extra capital from the peasantry for its industrial purpose.  
The Regulation established two enclosed systems in Chinese rural and urban areas since the end 
of the 1950s, which lacked freedom of movement and were endowed with different rights and 
duties. Although the constitution guarantees that all individuals deserved the title of “Chinese 
citizen,” this equality remained superficial while substantial inequalities between these two 
systems formed by the Regulations remained. As many scholars argue, rural household status 
was a noose imposed on the peasantry (Chan,1994), after which differences between the rural 
and the urban areas replaced that of the classes (Solinger, 1999). In 1979, China pioneered a new 
policy of Reform and Opening. The noose on the peasantry seemed to be loosened: peasants 
could go to the cities to stay as long as they wished without requiring certificates, they could 
enter factories to work for a small wage as long as they could find a job, and in rural areas the 
mechanism for the institutional control of the peasants, the People’s Commune (Renmin 
Gongshe), was also abolished. Citizenship of the peasants seemed to be improved or to be in the 
process of improving with the huge inequality between country and city seemed to be 
significantly alleviated.  
Yet, a closer scrutiny reveals that these rural migrants still remained confined within the 
framework set up by the household registration: though they can go to the cities now, most of 
them cannot obtain urban household status or membership of the urban community, their 
institutional status is still a rural one, which means that their electoral rights, medical care, 
pensions, housing benefits, children’s schooling, etc. all remain in the rural areas. Because they 
lack institutional protections in the cities and are considered “outsiders”(Zhang, 2012), they tend 
to be marginalized to the “3D” (dirty, difficult, and dangerous) jobs, with which the urbanites 
have no interest. Their wages are minimal and are often skimped or delayed. A closer look at 
migrant workers in the cities shows that peasants are still subjected to the state’s persistent 
imperative in the Reform Era: to promote the developments of urbanization and productivity, 
which was called “modernization” previously, at the costs of the peasants’ citizenship rights. 
While peasants may get some civil rights, especially the right of free movement, the huge 
inequalities between ruralites and urbanites/country and city still remain unchanged. 
Based on the above analysis, we can find that household registration(hukou) is an indispensable 
element for analyzing Chinese citizenship institutions. While nationality grants citizenship to 
residents who have Chinese lineage and live in Chinese territory, within the Chinese citizenry, 
household status(hukou) creates two separate communities based on the division of ruralities and 
urbanites, country and city. Chinese citizens are either members of the urban community or the 
rural one with each community entitled to different rights.  
5. CHINESE CITIZENSHIP AS ETHNICITY 
Ethnicity is another important element of Chinese internal citizenship institutions. Besides the 
majority Han Chinese, China has 55 ethnic minority groups, which are a majority of the 
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population in 60 percent of China’s territory. Based on the 2010 census of the Chinese population, 
some 91.5 percent of the population was classified as Han Chinese (1.23 billion), the rest are 
ethnic minorities (0.11 billion). But most of these minorities live in boundary provinces, for 
instance, the southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Tibet, the Western province of Xinjiang, or 
the northern province of Inner Mongolia. These areas are rich in natural resources like timber, 
water, and petroleum on the one hand, and border countries including Russia, India, Vietnam, 
Laos, Myanmar, Mongolia, North Korea, and the formers Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on the other hand. Some of the ethnic groups even have common 
ancestry with peoples in neighboring countries. For example, Korean, Mongol, Uygur, Kazak, 
and Yao minorities are found not only in China but also in Myanmar, Korea, the Mongolian 
People's Republic, Kazakhstan and Thailand as well. Because of their resources and locations, 
minorities are of vital importance for the Chinese government. If the Chinese government failed 
to maintain good relations with these groups, China's border security and national integration 
could be jeopardized. Considering this situation, since the 1950s, Chinese government 
promulgated a series of favorable policies towards the ethnic minority groups and regions, which 
in return have produced substantial influence on the institutions of Chinese citizenship.  
Though there have been some policy changes towards ethnic minority groups, especially during 
the Cultural Revolution(1966-1976), the core policies have basically been kept consistent since 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. These essential elements can be described as 
the following: 1)formal recognition that China is “multiethnic” in nature, 2)all nationalities are 
“equal” in status to prevent both Han chauvinism and minority ethnocentrism, 3)ethnic groups 
have the right of self-rule, and to promote ethnic cadres to rule their areas, 4)central government 
must recruit ethnic cadres to staff its agencies, shift resources into ethnic areas, and provide ethnic 
groups with exemptions or privileges (Yang, 1997). These core policies not only formed the base 
of the autonomous political institutions in minority regions, but also the specific characteristics 
of minority citizenship.  
If we regard citizenship, first, as full membership an individual holds in a political community, 
minority status then defines such community and membership. In 1952, the newly established 
Chinese government promulgated the Implemental Program for the Autonomy of the Regional 
Ethnic Areas, which stipulated conditions for founding autonomous regions, the status of the 
autonomous regions in the Chinese political system, and the rights that minorities could enjoy. 
Thereafter, the successive constitutional drafts2all confirmed the regional autonomous institution 
of the minority concentrated areas(Wang,1988:80-95). In 1984, the second session of the sixth 
National People's Congress passed the Law of People’s Republic of China on Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy (thereafter Regional Autonomy Law), which specified how the regional autonomous 
institution should be established in a systematic way. Based on these documents, China 
systematically established the institution of regional ethnic autonomy, among which, minority 
                                                             
2 Altogether, there were four formal constitutions in the post 1949 era, which were made in the year of 1954, 
1975, 1978, and 1982. The 1982 constitution has four amendments.  
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community is one of the most important pillars. For example, the second clause of the Regional 
Autonomy Law stipulates, “regional autonomy shall be practiced in areas where minorities are 
concentrated. Ethnic autonomous regions shall be classified into autonomous regions, 
autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties. All ethnic autonomous regions are integral 
parts of the People's Republic of China.” So far China has established five autonomous regions 
on the provincial level. They are Guangxi, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia, which 
are for minorities of Zhuang, Zang, Uygur, Mongol, and Hui respectively. Besides provincial 
autonomous regions, there are also 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, and 
1173 autonomous townships (Chinese Central Government, 2005). These regions, prefectures, 
counties, and townships are minority communities of different ethnic groups, only those who are 
classified as minorities can hold formal membership and enjoy the rights that are associated with 
membership, discussed below.  
Based on these communities and status, minorities can enjoy privileged political rights that that 
ensure equal treatment with Han. According to the third and fourth clauses of the Regional 
Autonomy Law, autonomous regions are Chinese local governments, which can exercise not only 
the power of local governments in general, but also the power of autonomy within the limits 
prescribed by the constitution, by the Regional Autonomous Law, and other laws for minorities 
in particular. For instance, the 16th provision of the Regional Autonomy Law stipulates, “the 
chairman of the autonomous region should be selected from the minority who exercise regional 
autonomy, and cadres in the departments of the autonomous regions should be mainly chosen 
among citizens of the minority who exercise regional autonomy and of other ethnic groups in the 
area.” Suffrage is another important element of political rights and compared with the Han 
majority, minority citizens can enjoy many privileges as well. According to China’s Electoral 
Law promulgated in 2004, by the sanction of the National People’s Congress (thereafter, NPC), 
autonomous regions can have an extra five percent of delegates above the average number of the 
local congress. For instance, the average number of deputies at the county level is 120, an 
autonomous region of the same level thus can have 126. At the same time, the Electoral Law has 
also stipulated that each minority should have at least one deputy in the NPC, no matter how 
small the ethnic group is. According to the statistics released by the 2010 census of the Chinese 
population, there were 6 minority ethnic groups whose populations were less than 10,000 in total. 
The smallest one was just 3556. Even these groups are guaranteed one deputy in the NPC. The 
proportion of political representation for these small groups is much higher than for the Han 
majority and other big minorities. As for the Han majority, the proportion amounted to 670,000 
citizens for one NPC deputy in the recent 12th NPC elections. Although when compared with 
western democratic countries, the political rights of Chinese citizens are less represented and less 
important in general, ethnic groups are more privileged in this regard than the Han majority. 
If we follow the Marshallian paradigm and consider social rights as one of the indispensable 
elements of citizenship rights, minorities enjoy many privileged social rights as well. The 
Regional Autonomous Law specified the social rights that ethnic minorities have, which can be 
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classified into two categories: the first is the concrete rights that minorities enjoy, which include 
linguistic, educational, health, cultural, economic, ecological, family planning, and other 
dimensions. For example, according to the third provision of the 37th clause, “schools (classes 
and grades) and other institutions of education where most of the students come from minority 
nationalities shall, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use their 
languages as the media of instruction.” Minorities thus can use their own language for teaching 
where applicable. As to the family planning policy, minorities with a total population less than 
ten million can have a second child and, in some places such as mountainous counties, and for 
some minorities with sparse population density, a third or even a fourth child is also allowed 
(CCP Central Committee, 1984). As to other cultural aspects, minorities are allowed to practice 
their religion, marriage customs, and other aspects of their culture as they please, some of the 
nonpolitical expressions of ethnicity, such as native costumes and folk dances, are even 
encouraged. 
The second category of social rights includes resource allocation and policies offered by upper 
level governments. There are many provisions in the Regional Autonomous Law that prescribe 
the responsibilities that upper level governments must bear for promoting the social and 
economic developments of the ethnical regions. These responsibilities are mostly financial and 
policy oriented. According to the White Papers of Chinese Regional National Autonomy released 
in 2009, the Chinese central government adopted various policies for and offered huge financial 
investments in the regional ethnic areas, which included priority for policy making, 
improvements in infrastructure, increase in financial support, special measures for educational 
development, reduction of various forms of poverty, etc. in the ethnic areas. As for financial 
investments, for example, regarding infrastructure expenditures in 2003, the total investment in 
fixed assets in ethnic autonomous areas was 473.4 billion yuan, 3.7 times that of 1994. Of this, 
283.7 billion yuan was invested in infrastructure construction, 4.2 times that of 1994 (Chinese 
Central Government, 2005). Also in 2003, the state-owned railway operation mileage in ethnic 
autonomous areas reached 15,100 km, a near three-fold increase of 297 percent compared with 
1952; the highways open to traffic in autonomous areas totaled 547,800 km, 21 times that in 
1952(ibid, 2005). 
Although the assumption that national citizenship takes precedence over the ethnic one has not 
changed since the foundation of the PRC, the latter offers minority groups different identities and 
favorable citizenship rights. Based on the minority communities and rights mentioned above, 
ethnic citizenship has become an important legal status in China. Though the Chinese central 
government has offered ethnic groups independent spaces, rights of self-government, and many 
other privileges, some of these groups are by no means satisfied with their situation. In areas such 
as the Tibet or Xinjiang autonomous regions, the previously independent or semi-autonomous 
Tibetans and Uygurs want greater independence and more rights, sometimes even a separate state. 
They hate the large numbers of Han settlers in their regions and tensions and conflicts between 
Han and minorities ensued one after another in the past several decades. To a large extent, the 
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goal of regional ethnic autonomy is to exchange rights with integration and patriotism, but in the 
regional ethnic communities, ethnic groups appear to lead largely separate lives which intensify 
their ethnic identities and in turn undermine the state’s legitimacy and integration. 
6. CONCLUSION 
From the institutional perspective, citizenship has long been considered an individual’s formal 
membership in a given political community and citizenship rights resulted from such a 
membership (Marshall and Bottomore,1992; Janoski,1998:8-11; Lister,2003:15). The 
institutions of citizenship in China share the same meaning. But if we understand Chinese 
citizenship as the same as its Western counterpart, we neglect its unique traits. Outside of its 
similarities with Western conceptions of citizenship, Chinese citizenship also has many unique 
traits, which can be roughly construed through the lens of structure, criterion, and function of 
Chinese citizenship.  
To begin with the structure, for most countries in the world, the institutional structure of 
citizenship is determined by state structure. A unitary system often has just one layer of 
citizenship, that is, nationality or national citizenship. France is the most important case in this 
regard. In contrast, a federal structure may have two layers of citizenship: citizenship of the 
federal level(national level) and that of the sub-national level(or local level). The U.S.A. is the 
most important case of this kind. In this case, the federal level is more important than the local 
level, and the latter is mainly for the purpose of economic, social and cultural affairs. China has 
declared itself a unitary state since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. The preface 
of the 1982 constitution stipulated that “the People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational 
state created jointly by the people of all its nationalities,” which means, though Chinese 
authorities admit China is a multinational state and was jointly created by all its nationalities, 
China is essentially a unitary state. China’s unitary nature is evident in many political aspects. 
For example, it has just one constitution, the power of local governments is endowed by the 
central government, and this power can be expanded but also can be taken away. But the structure 
of Chinese citizenship is by no means unitary. On the contrary, as we have illustrated above, 
there are multiple levels of citizenship. National citizenship, or nationality, is a universal 
citizenship for all Chinese citizens. Descendants of Chinese citizens who do not possess foreign 
citizenships can naturally obtain Chinese citizenship(jus sanguinis). Nationality is the boundary 
between Chinese citizens and foreigners and provides the former with basic citizenship rights 
and obligations, for example, the right of receiving compulsory education, consulate protection 
in a foreign country, etc. Nationality is the “international passport” of Chinese citizens, but there 
are “internal passports”(Torpey,2000:164-165) as well. That is, within the Chinese citizenry, 
hukou(household status) and ethnicity are more substantial. Different household or ethnic 
statuses form distinct citizenship rights and obligations. Though national citizenship confers 
Chinese individuals with equal legal status, these sub-national levels of citizenship, to a large 
degree, create unequal rights and obligations within the Chinese citizenry. 
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As to criterion of gaining citizenship, it is generally believed that there are two basic ways for 
accessing citizenship: ascription and naturalization. The former means “every state ascribes its 
citizenship to certain persons at birth,” while the latter means “[p]ersons to whom the citizenship 
of a state is not ascribed at birth may be able to acquire it later in life through 
naturalization”(Brubaker, 1992: 31-34). But in reality, different states may use different methods 
for ascription: some ascribe according to ethnic background, which forms the principle of jus 
sanguinis, while some confer according to territory, which forms the principle of jus soli. These 
two criteria and naturalization form the basic principles for accessing to citizenship: jus sanguinis, 
jus soli, and jus domicile (Choe, 2006). Although these principles are more complicated in reality 
and different states often combine them together for regulating access to their citizenship, all 
laws on citizenship or nationality are based at least on these three basic principles. Federal 
systems have two levels of citizenship. The basic principle for differentiating citizenships of the 
federal level and the local ones is the constitution, which makes clear demarcations between the 
federal government and the member states. 
Chinese citizenship follows some of the above principles, but also has its own unique principles. 
At the national level, Chinese nationality is ascribed with jus sanguinis, which means ethnic 
connection with a Chinese citizen is the premise for access to Chinese citizenship. Though the 
Chinese government also confers green cards to people who hold foreign citizenship, it is not a 
universal practice and the green card also does not provide full citizenship. The principles of 
Chinese local citizenships are more complicated, among which, household and ethnic status are 
the two most important facets. Household status is based on the division between country and 
city, and different residential statuses bring forward different citizenships. Ethnic status is the 
second principle of Chinese local citizenship, which is based on the division between Han 
majority and ethnic minorities. An ethnic status not only bestows an individual with a different 
membership, but endows him with different citizenship rights as well. No matter which local 
citizenship, the constitution does not play a vital role as in its western counterpart. From the 
Chinese experience we can conclude that citizenship not only can be based on jus sanguinis, jus 
soli, and jus domicili, it can also be based on residential and ethnic status, so the criterion for 
classifying citizenship is far more complicated than it has commonly been envisaged. 
Finally, what are the particular functions of Chinese citizenship? There have been many theories 
about the function of citizenship. For example, Mann(1996) thought citizenship was no more 
than “ruling class strategies” or means of “domination.” On the contrary, Turner(1990, 1993) 
thought it could be one approach for “right claiming” or “empowerment.” For Isin (2009, 2012), 
citizenship can be both domination and empowerment separately or simultaneously. But for 
many other authors, citizenship means measures of “inclusion” and “exclusion,” it includes 
certain individuals as the citizenry while excludes others (Brubaker, 1992; Lister, 2003; Torpey, 
2000). To a certain degree, all of these articulations about the properties of citizenship fit the 
Chinese case. Every form of Chinese citizenship (nationality, hukou, and ethnicity), no matter on 
which level (national or local), is both inclusive and exclusive, it defines and identifies the 
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“insiders” and “outsiders” explicitly in accordance with formally articulated criteria. The insiders 
are empowered with certain citizenship rights while the outsiders are excluded.  
But as a whole, besides these general functions, Chinese citizenship has also exhibited certain 
special functions. From the perspective of nationality, although Chinese nationality follows the 
principle of jus sanguinis in general, it can be flexible. After the Reform and Opening at the end 
of 1970s, when absorbing more foreign investment and technology became the main goals for 
Chinese modernization, citizenship became one mean for this end, and the green card system was 
invented. Citizenship as hukou also connoted the same implication. In the late 1950s, when the 
Chinese government wanted fervently to develop its heavy industry and catch up with Western 
countries, the institution of household registration, which shaped Chinese citizenship profoundly, 
was brought forward. Hukou was not only a means for the state to control the flow of population 
and labor power, but also an important means to levy the profits of the peasantry. The same 
function is also demonstrated by the institution of regional ethnic autonomy. As I have 
expounded above, the reasons that the Chinese government established this institution, to a large 
degree, were to pacify the border provinces and to enhance legitimacy and patriotism in the 
minority groups; political considerations exceeded the importance of citizenship rights. So, from 
China’s experience, we can see that citizenship is not always constant; on the contrary, it serves 
the overall goals of the state. Important political and economic goals such as economic 
development, technology modernization, diplomatic relation, national security and integration, 
and political legitimacy have direct effects on the formation and change of the citizenship 
institutions of a country. 
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